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CASES NOTED
use of the privilege without actual possession. "28 To require that a
claimant to a prescriptive easement establish exclusive adverse posses-
sion, rather than non-exclusive adverse use of the property in which
the easement is claimed is a new and startling development.
In considering the impact of Daytona v. Tona-Rama, two distinc-
tions between prescription and custom must be examined. Of primary
importance is the nature of the use required for each. Consent of the
owner to the use, which would destroy the adverseness necessary to
establish prescription, is not similarly effective to defeat a right based
on custom. With the application of custom to claims of a public
easement in private ocean-front property, beach owners have lost as a
defense the fact that they had granted permission for past public use.
A second significant difference between prescription and custom is
the required duration of the use involved. The requirement for pre-
scription is use for exactly twenty years. 29 For custom, the test is
imprecise-ancient use continuing from time immemorial. 30 The is-
sues of what duration of public use will be considered ancient and
what range of uses will be considered consistent with a public ease-
ment must still be resolved. The answers may be given soon as
pressures from a growing population with competing demands on the
beaches increase the frequency of these cases.
PATRICIA IRELAND
NO REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE COUNSEL FOR
INDIGENTS ON DISCRETIONARY APPEALS
Respondent Moffitt, an indigent represented by court-appointed
counsel, was convicted twice of forgery in two North Carolina coun-
ties. Both convictions were affirmed on first appeals of right to the
North Carolina Court of Appeals.' In one case the State refused to
provide counsel for the discretionary appeal to the state supreme court;
in the other, respondent was represented by a public defender and the
Supreme Court of North Carolina denied certiorari.2 Respondent
28. Downing v. Bird, 100 So. 2d 57, 65 (Fla. 1958) (emphasis added).
29. J.C. Vereen & Sons, Inc. v. Houser, 123 Fla. 641, 167 So. 45 (1936).
30. 1 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 75-78. In State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore.
584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969), the public use of the beach was admitted to have continued for more
than sixty years. The court's opinion traced the use of the dry sand areas from the aboriginal
inhabitants through the first European settlers to the present day residents. Testimony cited in
the Attorney General's brief established public use of the beach for at least fifty-two years.
1. State v. Moffitt, 9 N.C. App. 694, 177 S.E.2d 324 (1970) (this was the conviction in
Mecklenburg County); State v. Moffitt, 11 N.C. App. 337, 181 S.E.2d 184 (1971) (this was the
conviction from Guilford County).
2. State v. Moffitt, 279 N.C. 396, 183 S.E.2d 247 (1971).
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sought relief in the federal courts through habeas corpus petitions,
both of which were denied. The United States Court of Appeals
reversed in both cases. 3 The United States Supreme Court on conflict
certiorari 4 review of the consolidated cases held, reversed: The four-
teenth amendment does not require states to provide counsel for indi-
gents for discretionary appeals in state or federal courts. Ross v.
Moffitt, 94 S. Ct. 2437 (1974).
The United States Supreme Court first considered the rights of an
indigent on appeal in Griffin v. Illinois.5 An Illinois rule provided that
convicted persons could secure an appeal only if they procured a
transcript of testimony at trial. Only indigents sentenced to death were
provided with a free transcript. The Court in Griffin stated:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which
would deny the poor the right to defend themselves in a trial
and one which effectively denies the poor an adequate appel-
late review accorded to all who have enough to pay the cost
in advance.
6
The Court therefore found that the Illinois procedure was a financial
discrimination in violation of the fourteenth amendment, and thus,
granted an indigent the right to obtain a free transcript for appeal
purposes.
The Supreme Court continued to follow the philosophy of Griffin
in later cases7 and in Douglas v. California,8 it dealt directly with the
question of an indigent's right to counsel on appeal. Petitioners, con-
victed of thirteen felonies, requested counsel for their first appeal of
right to a California district court of appeal. The district court denied
their request for counsel, stating that it had examined the record and
had come to the conclusion that "no good whatever could be served by
3. Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1973).
4, United States ex rel. Pennington v. Pate, 409 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1969); Peters v. Cox, 341
F.2d 575 (10th Cir. 1965).
5. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) [hereinafter referred to as Griffin].
6. Id. at 18.
7. The Court invalidated similar financial impediments created by the states, such as a court
rule requiring a $20 docketing fee in order to move to appeal, Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252
(1959); and a requirement of a filing fee prior to processing a habeas corpus petition, Smith v.
Bennet, 365 U.S. 708 (1961). In each case "these state-imposed financial barriers to the adjudica-
tion of a criminal defendant's appeal was held to violate the Fourteenth Amendment." 94 S. Ct.
at 2442.
During the 1963 session, the Supreme Court decided two cases which continued the de-
velopment of fourteenth amendment principles begun in Griffin. These cases, Draper v.
Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), and Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963), concerned an
indigent's right to a transcript. In Draper the Court invalidated the state procedure whereby an
indigent could receive a free transcript only if the trial judge determined that the appeal would
not be frivolous. Similarly, in Lane the Court struck down an Indiana provision giving the
indigent's appointed counsel the sole right to request a free transcript for an appeal. In both cases
the Court determined that the indigent had a right to obtain the transcript without these
procedural impediments.
8. 372 U.S. 353 (1963) [hereinafter referred to as Douglas].
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appointment of counsel." 9 Thus, an indigent's appellate merit would
be prejudged without the assistance of counsel, while a person who
could pay would receive the full benefit of counsel before the appellate
court would decide on the merits.
The United States Supreme Court found that this procedure,
which was in accord with a state rule of criminal procedure, was "an
unconstitutional line ... drawn between rich and poor" 10 in violation
of the fourteenth amendment and held that an indigent has an absolute
right to appointed counsel on an appeal of right in a state criminal
conviction. I" The absolute right to counsel mandated by Douglas was
expressly limited to first appeals as of right.
We are not here concerned with problems that might
arise from the denial of counsel for the preparation of a
petition for discretionary or mandatory review . . . . We are
dealing only with the first appeal, granted as a matter of right
to rich and poor alike from a criminal conviction.' 2
It was to this purposely unanswered question that the respondent
Moffit directed his case "to determine whether Douglas v. California
. . . which requires appointment of counsel for indigent state defen-
dants on their first appeal as of right, should be extended to require
counsel for discretionary state appeals and for applications for review
[to the Supreme Court].' 1 3 The Court refused to so extend Douglas,
and reversed the decision of the court of appeals.1 4 The court of
appeals had concluded that there is "no logical basis for differentiation
between appeals as of right and permissive review procedures in the
context of the Constitution and the right to counsel."' 5 The court of
appeals further reasoned that when states establish an intermediate
appellate court, such as the North Carolina Court of Appeals, the
states intend that court to have final determinative power. Although
this system limits review by the highest court, it does not by any
means preclude such review. Therefore, the right to appeal to the
highest court is still an important right of a convicted person, espe-
cially with regard to criminal constitutional questions where "permis-
sive review in the state's highest court may be predictably the most
meaningful review the conviction will receive."' 6 The fact that the
highest court has the discretion to choose whether to review does not
9. People v. Douglas, 187 Cal. App. 2d 802, 812, 10 Cal. Rptr. 188, 195 (2d Dist. 1960).
10. 372 U.S. at 357.
11. The decision is based on general principles of fairness of the fourteenth amendment as
discussed by Justice Harlan in his dissent. "The Court appears to rely both on the Equal
Protection Clause and on the guarantees of fair procedure inherent in the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, with obvious emphasis on 'equal protection'." Id. at 360.
12. Id. at 356.
13. 94 S. Ct. at 2440.
14. Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1973).
15. Id. at 653.
16. Id.
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decrease the importance of the right to ask such court to review. This
argument, however, was apparently unpersuasive to the majority of
the Supreme Court Justices.
The Supreme Court recognized that the Griffin line of decisions
had been based on general fourteenth amendment principles rather
than on an express clause. Discussing first the due process rationale,
the Supreme Court emphasized the significant distinctions between the
trial and appellate stages of a criminal proceeding. Recognizing the
fundamental right to counsel at trial propounded in Gideon v.
Wainwright 17 that "any person hauled into court, who is too poor to
hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided
for him,"' 8 the Court went on to contrast this with appellate review.
Using an analogy, Justice Rehnquist likened a lawyer at trial to a
shield, and a lawyer on appeal to a sword to upset a prior conviction.
Reiterating the constitutional principle stated in Griffin and Douglas
that a state need not provide any appellate process at all, 19 the Court
found the distinction between the trial and appellate levels to be
compelling. "The fact that an appeal has been provided does not
automatically mean that a State then acts unfairly by refusing to
provide counsel to indigent defendants at every stage of the way." 20
The Court indicated that the more appropriate analysis would be
a consideration of equal protection principles. Once again the Court
distinguished between the stages of a criminal proceeding. When an
indigent has been represented at trial and on a first appeal of right
there is a substantial record from which a higher court might discern
error. While an indigent would not enjoy the benefits of a highly
skilled attorney, the indigent would suffer only a relative handicap.
"The Fourteenth Amendment 'does not require absolute equality or
precisely equal advantages'."
2 1
Discussing the procedures of North Carolina and other states, the
Court reached the conclusion that
[t]he duty of the State under our cases is not to duplicate the
legal arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal
defendant in a continuing effort to revise his conviction, but
only to assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportun-
ity to present his claims fairly in the context of the State's
appellate process.
2 2
In the court of appeals decision distinctions of procedure on
discretionary review were also discussed, and that court concluded
that representation of indigents by counsel is equally important on
discretionary review as on appeal by right. By way of discretionary
17. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
18. Id. at 344.
19. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894).
20. 94 S. Ct. at 2444 (emphasis in original).
21. Id. at 2444, citing San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973).
22. 94 S. Ct. at 2447.
CASES NOTED
review procedures, the highest courts of states have adopted strict
rules for petitioning for certiorari. "Certiorari proceedings constitute a
highly specialized aspect of appellate work. The factors which [a court]
deems important in connection with deciding whether to grant cer-
tiorari are not within the normal knowledge of an indigent
appellant."2 3 The court further noted that there are valid and impor-
tant distinctions among the various levels of appellate review. But the
distinctions do not derogate the importance of counsel on such review;
conversely, the complexity of appellate procedure calls for even more
technical assistance, the absence of which would put the indigent at a
severe disadvantage.
In a dissenting opinion2 4 Justice Douglas, joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, urged affirmance of the court of appeals'
decision. Douglas cited with approval Judge Haynsworth's conclusion
that there was "no logical basis for differentiation between appeals of
right and permissive review procedures in the context of the Constitu-
tion and the right to counsel." '25 The dissent concluded that the distinc-
tion between appeals of right and discretionary appeals relied on so
heavily by the majority is an artificial distinction having no real
relationship to standards of fairness.
Under either a due process or an equal protection analysis, the
reasoning of the court of appeals seems much more firmly based on
fourteenth amendment principles than does the Supreme Court deci-
sion. It is an established Constitutional principle that the courts do not
require states to "equalize economic conditions," 26 in such areas as
education and living conditions; however, the basic ideal of the Con-
stitution is that in a court room, all persons will have an equal
opportunity to present their claims. "There can be no equal justice
where the kind of an appeal a man enjoys 'depends on the amount of
money he has'."
'27
The Supreme Court cited cases holding that a state cannot adopt
procedures which leave an indigent "entirely cut off from any appeal
at all," '2 8 or procedures which extend to indigents merely a "meaning-
less ritual."'29 However, the practical application of the holding would
seem to do just that. The procedures for discretionary review are freely
available to all as long as the person appealing has the legal knowledge
and skill available to surmount the technical requirements of discretion-
ary appeals. Since relatively few people have such knowledge and
23. 483 F.2d at 653, citing Boskey, The Right to Counsel in Appellate Proceedings, 45
MINN. L. REv. 783, 797 (1961).
24. 94 S. Ct. at 2448.
25. 483 F.2d at 653.
26. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 23 (1956).
27. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963), quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,
19 (1956).
28. Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 481 (1963).
29. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963).
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skill, the indigent will be effectively stopped from further meaningful
review after a first appeal of right.
The gradual extension of fourteenth amendment rights for indi-
gents on appeal led one commentator to assume that a logical progres-
sion would be affirmance by the United States Supreme Court.3 0 Such
would have seemed the purely logical result but there are no doubt
certain background factors which must be considered-the rising vol-
ume of cases3 ' and the increasing costs of appeals by public defenders
on behalf of indigents.
3 2
However, as the court of appeals pointed out, appointed counsel
for discretionary review is not a huge financial burden for the states.
The attorney who represented the indigent at trial and on the first
appeal is familiar with the case and can quite easily prepare an
efficient petition for discretionary review. Such a theory was also
expressed by Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion.
33
The Supreme Court did not rely heavily on practical aspects such
as cost and overburdened courts. The Court's argument is apparently
based on both principles of due process and equal protection. How-
ever, under analysis, the decision is not adequately supported by either
principle. It is submitted that while due process under the fourteenth
amendment may not require any appellate review at all, when a state
does provide such review, as North Carolina does, the equal protec-
tion clause requires equal accessibility to appellate courts. From the
viewpoint of a convicted defendant the right to have counsel for a
permissive review is of substantial importance and denial of counsel is
much more than a "relative handicap."
In the final section of the majority opinion the Court stated that
this decision was not intended to discourage states from providing
counsel for all stages of appellate review. However, the Court further
explained that some states do not have adequate funds to do so. Thus
it seems in the final analysis that the Supreme Court compromised the
principles of the fourteenth amendment by striking a balance between
right to counsel under the Constitution and the economic and case-load
realities facing the. judicial system.
CHRISTINE P. TATUM
30. Note, The Right to Counsel on Permissive Appellate Review, 9 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
588 (1973).
31. G. HAZARD, AFTER THE TRIAL COURT-THE REALITIES OF APPELLATE REVIEW, THE
COURTS, THE PUBLIC AND THE LAW EXPLOSION (1965).
32. See Mobley v. State, 215 So. 2d 90, 94 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
33. 94 S. Ct. at 2449.
